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Abstract—Cache randomization has recently been revived as
a promising defense against conflict-based cache side-channel
attacks. As two of the latest implementations, CEASER-S and
ScatterCache both claim to thwart conflict-based cache side-
channel attacks using randomized skewed caches. Unfortunately,
our experiments show that an attacker can easily find a usable
eviction set within the chosen remap period of CEASER-S and
increasing the number of partitions without dynamic remapping,
such as ScatterCache, cannot eliminate the threat. By quantita-
tively analyzing the access patterns left by various attacks in
the LLC, we have newly discovered several problems with the
hypotheses and implementations of randomized caches, which
are also overlooked by the research on conflict-based cache side-
channel attack.
However, cache randomization is not a false hope and it is
an effective defense that should be widely adopted in future
processors. The newly discovered problems are corresponding
to flaws associated with the existing implementation of cache
randomization and are fixable. Several new defense techniques
are proposed in this paper. our experiments show that all the
newly discovered vulnerabilities of existing randomized caches
are fixed within the current performance budget. We also
argue that randomized set-associative caches can be sufficiently
strengthened and possess a better chance to be actually adopted
in commercial processors than their skewed counterparts as they
introduce less overhual to the existing cache structure.
I. INTRODUCTION
To reduce the latency of accessing memory, modern com-
puters adopt a multi-level cache hierarchy where the last-level
cache (LLC) is shared between all processing cores. Such
sharing improves the utilization efficiency of the LLC as it
can dynamically adapt its space allocation to the demand of
different cores. However, it also allows a malicious software
to trigger controlled conflicts in the LLC, such as evicting a
specific cache set with attackers’ data [1]–[3], to infer security-
critical information of a victim program. This type of conflict-
based cache side-channel attacks have been utilized to recover
cryptographic keys [4], break the sandbox defense [5], inject
faults directly into the DRAM [6], and extract information
from the supposedly secure SGX enclaves [7].
Cache partitioning [8]–[10] used to be the only effective de-
fense against conflict-based cache side-channel attacks abusing
the LLC. It separates security-critical data from normal data
in the LLC; therefore, attackers cannot evict security-critical
data by triggering conflicts using normal data. However, cache
partitioning is ineffective when security-critical data cannot be
easily separated from normal data [11] or normal data become
the target [6]. It also reduces the autonomy of the LLC which
in turn hurts performance. Finally, cache partitioning relies
on specific operating system (OS) code to identify security-
critical data, which means the OS must be trusted.
Recently, cache randomization [12]–[20] has been revived
as a promising defense. Instead of cache partitioning, cache
randomization randomizes the mapping from memory ad-
dresses to cache set indices. This forces attackers to slowly find
eviction sets using search algorithms at run-time [3], [21]–[23]
rather than directly calculating eviction set indices beforehand.
Even when eviction sets are found, attackers cannot tell which
cache sets are evicted by them. However, cache randomization
alone does not defeat conflict-based cache side-channel attacks
but only increases difficulty and latency [15]. For this reason,
dynamic remapping [15], [18] has been introduced to limit
the time window available to attackers and skewed cache [16]–
[18] has been proposed to further increase the attack difficulty.
As two of the latest implementations, CEASER-S [16]
and ScatterCache [17] both claim to thwart conflict-based
cache side-channel attacks using randomized skewed caches.
ScatterCache even argues that dynamic remapping might not
be necessary as the extra difficulty introduced by skewed cache
is hard enough.
Unfortunately, our experiments show that an attacker can
easily find a usable eviction set within the chosen remap period
of CEASER-S [16] and increasing the number of partitions
without dynamic remapping, such as ScatterCache [17], cannot
eliminate the threat. By quantitatively analyzing the access
patterns left by various attacks in the LLC, we have newly
discovered several problems with the hypotheses and imple-
mentations of randomized caches, which are also overlooked
by the research on conflict-based cache side-channel attacks.
• The possibility of using cache flush instructions in
conflict-based attacks has been overlooked. Our study
shows, if attackers flush the eviction set after each probe,
partial congruent eviction sets can be repeatedly used to
drastically speed up attacks and significantly reduce the
latency in finding eviction sets.
• The concept of minimal eviction set no longer applies to
randomized skewed caches. Any group of cache blocks
that can evict the target address with a reasonable prob-
ability should be considered a usable eviction set.
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• Attackers do not have to use eviction sets with 99%
eviction rate. When finding such sets become too difficult,
attackers will utilize eviction sets with low eviction rate
but possible to find.
• Measuring the remap period by LLC accesses is flawed,
since a significant portion of all the cache accesses might
be filtered by the private level-one (L1) or level-two (L2)
caches. The actual number of accesses observed by the
LLC is much smaller than the total number of cache
accesses. As a result, the remap period estimated by
CEASER-S [16] is over-optimistic.
However, cache randomization is not a false hope. We
strongly believe it is an effective defense strategy that should
be widely adopted in future processors. The above-discovered
problems are corresponding to flaws associated with the ex-
isting tactics towards accomplishing the “cache randomiza-
tion” strategy. We believe that these problems are fixable,
and that fixing these problems will make the strategy sig-
nificantly more effective in defending conflict-based cache
side-channel attacks. In particular, several new defense tech-
niques/suggestions are proposed in this paper:
• Measure the remap period by LLC evictions rather than
accesses because the probability of successfully finding
an eviction set is closely related to the number of evic-
tions allowed between remaps.
• Further reduce the period to stop attackers from finding
even small partially congruent eviction sets.
• Adopte ZCache-like [24] multi-step relocation to mini-
mize the number of cache blocks evicted during the remap
process.
• Promote the use of CEASER (randomized set-associative
cache) rather than skewed caches because CEASER
introduces less overhual to the existing cache structure
than skewed caches and it can be made secure enough.
• A simple attack detection mechanism to further strengthen
CEASER.
By utilizing these defense techniques/suggestions, our ex-
periments show that all the newly discovered vulnerabilities
of existing randomized caches can be fixed within the current
performance budget and the randomized set-associative caches
can be made secure enough with reasonable performance
overhead.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces the
necessary background information to understand this paper.
Section III formulates the problems we try to answer in this
paper. Section IV demonstrates the vulnerabilities of existing
randomized caches by experiments. Section V shows how we
can fix the randomized skewed caches and Section VI presents
solutions to safely strengthen the randomized set-associative
caches. The performance overhead is analyzed in Section VII.
The limitations and related work are discussed in Section VIII.
Section IX finally concludes the paper.
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Fig. 1. A set-associative cache.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Caches
Modern processors use caches to store recently or frequently
used data to reduce the memory access time. Most caches
adopts a set-associative structure [25] as shown in Fig. 1.
The cache space is divided into S cache sets and each set
contains W ways of cache blocks. Cache sets are addressed
by a cache set index which is typically a subset of the
address bits shared by all cache blocks in the same set. If two
addresses are mapped to the same cache set, they are congruent
addresses [22]. When an address is accessed, the cache checks
whether there is a match (hit) in the corresponding cache set
by comparing tags. If no match is found (a miss), the cache
block is fetched and stored in the cache set for future use. The
specific position (way) to store this newly fetched cache block
is chosen by a replacement policy and the old block is evicted.
As a commonly used replacement policy, least-recently used
(LRU) [26] retains the recently accessed cache blocks.
Multiple levels of caches are normally hierarchically orga-
nized. A processing core might have one or two levels of
private caches (L1 and L2 caches) while all cores share a
large LLC. An inclusive relationship between private caches
and the LLC is usually adopted [25]. When a cache block
is evicted from the LLC, it is also purged from all private
caches. A hardware managed coherence protocol ensures data
are correctly updated between caches.
B. Conflict-Based Cache Side-Channel Attacks
Conflict-based cache side-channel attacks [27] exploit the
fact that cache blocks in the same set are congruent. This
allows attackers to maliciously control the status of a target
cache set using a group of at least W congruent addresses
(cache blocks), namely an eviction set.
An attack normally occurs in two phases: preparation phase
when the attacker collects enough number of eviction sets,
and exploitation phase when the attacker infers sensitive
information from a victim by controlling the status of certain
cache sets using the collected eviction sets.
Before cache randomization is applied, collecting eviction
sets are relatively easy because attackers can deliberately
construct an eviction set using addresses having the same
cache set index bits [3]. This becomes unfeasible when caches
are randomized.
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Fig. 2. A randomized skewed cache with two partitions over four cache
ways.
The exploitation phase normally contains numerous
prime+probe cycles [1]–[3]. In each cycle, the attacker first
primes a target set by filling it with cache blocks from a cor-
responding eviction set. If there were cache blocks belonging
to the victim, they are likely evicted in the prime process.
The attacker then tricks the victim into running a program
segment related to the target cache set. If the victim indeed
accesses data indexed to the same cache set, it must have been
fetched into the cache set and one block of the eviction set
is consequently evicted. Finally the attacker probes the cache
set by re-accessing all blocks of the eviction set. If the total
access latency is longer than expected, the attacker learns that
the victim should have accessed the target cache set, which
might further infer other security-critical information.
C. Randomized Caches
The main objective of cache randomization is to deprive
attackers from useful eviction sets [15]–[17]. The latest im-
plementation of cache randomization is randomized skewed
caches [16], [17], while randomized set-associative caches [15]
can be considered as a special case with only one partition.
Fig. 2 presents a randomized skewed cache whose four cache
ways are evenly divided into two partitions independently
indexed. Instead of using a subset of address bits, the cache
set index is generated from an encryptor taking the whole
address and a hardware managed key as inputs. Assuming the
encryption algorithm is unbroken and the key is not leaked,
the cache set index is a random number unobservable to
attackers. They can no longer construct eviction sets simply
by picking addresses but dynamically search for congruent ad-
dresses through run-time experiments, which was considered
an intolerable long procedure [3], [21]–[23].
Another major benefit of randomized skewed caches is the
reduced effectiveness of eviction sets. Considering two random
addresses, they are fully congruent when they are mapped
to the same sets in all partitions while they are partially
congruent when they are mapped to the same sets in some
but not all partitions. A group of W addresses, where W is
the number of ways, forms a fully congruent eviction set only
when all of the W addresses are fully congruent. However, the
probability that two random addresses are fully congruent in
a K partitioned skewed cache is 1
SK
, where S is the number
N addresses
W+1 groups
 addresses
remove 1 group
W+1
WN
Fig. 3. Group elimination algorithm.
of cache sets. This is an extremely small probability when K
is large. Finding such a fully congruent eviction set at run-
time is unfeasible. Therefore, attackers have no choice but
to use partially congruent eviction sets composed of partially
congruent addresses. This has two drawbacks [17], [28]: The
number of addresses needed is significantly increased and the
eviction of the target address becomes a statistically random
event.
D. Fast Algorithms for Searching Eviction Sets
At the time when CEASER was proposed, the fastest
algorithm [3], [21] for finding a minimal eviction set with
W addresses required O(N2) cache accesses, where N is the
number of addresses randomly collected to form a very large
eviction set. As N is normally at the magnitude with the size
of the LLC (N ∼ S ·W ) [23], O(N2) cache accesses are
just too long for any practical attacks. Soon afterwards, three
fast search algorithms are proposed to drastically reduce the
accesses.
Group elimination (GE) is an optimization of the original
O(N2) method [16], [22]. It still starts with a very large
eviction set of N random addresses but it tries to remove
multiple addresses in each cycle to quickly shrink the set into
a minimal one. Fig. 3 illustrates such a cycle targeting an
LLC with four ways. The set of N addresses are divided into
W + 1 groups. Since a minimal eviction set contains only W
addresses (shadowed in red), there is at least one removable
group containing none of the W addresses. By sequentially
testing whether the set is still an eviction set without a certain
group, the removable group is found and removed. Then
the whole process starts again taking the remaining WNW+1
addresses as the input set until a minimal set is produced.
The whole process requires around O(WN) cache accesses.
Since N ∼ SW , O(WN) ∼ O(SW 2).
Conflict testing (CT) is a new algorithm first proposed to
find eviction sets in caches using random replacement [16].
Assuming an attacker has access to unlimited number of ran-
dom addresses, she can collect an eviction set by sequentially
testing each address whether it is congruent with the target
address. The target address is accessed first to make it cached
in the LLC. Then a random address is accessed. If this address
is congruent with the target address, it might replace the target
address by a chance of 1W thanks to the random replacement.
Overall, any random address might conflict with the target
address by a probability of 1S·W . To test the occurrence of
such a conflict, the target address is re-accessed and timed.
If the latency is longer than expected, the random address is
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Fig. 4. Prime, prune and then test on a 3-set 4-way LLC using the LRU
replacement. (a) reveals the LLC internal states after prime and prune. (b)
demonstrates a success test in an ideal case where all cache accesses are
observed by the LLC. (c) shows a partial result in a non-ideal scenario when
some cache accesses are filtered by the private caches and the observed orders
of prime+prune and test are different.
considered congruent and put into the eviction set. The re-
accessing of the target address also starts the test for the next
random address. An eviction set is produced when enough
congruent addresses are collected. The overall number of
cache accesses is estimated around O(SW 2).
Note that this algorithm is effective for LLCs using
permutation-based replacement (such as LRU) as well. As-
suming the use of LRU, the probability of causing a conflict
with the target address after accessing M random addresses
is around:
P = 1−
W−1∑
i=0
(
M
i
)
1
Si
(1− 1
S
)M−i (1)
This is equivalent to causing at least W conflicts in the
target cache set. The average M is around SW . Note that
re-accessing the target address is unlikely to cause an actual
access to the LLC because the target address is always cached
in private caches (L1) until it is forcefully evicted by a conflict
in the LLC. As a result, the LRU replacer’s internal state is
unchanged for most re-accessing of the target address. To find
a minimal eviction set with W addresses, the number of cache
accesses is also around O(SW 2).
Prime, prune and then test (PPT) is an improved version
of the search algorithm exploiting the LRU replacement [16],
[28]. Let us consider an LLC using the LRU replacement. An
attacker first accesses a large set of random addresses (prime
set) to prime the whole LLC1. Since self-conflicts would
naturally occur during the prime, a prune process is used
to remove conflicted addresses until all addresses remaining
in the prime set are concurrently cached. Assuming Fig. 4a
reveals the internal states of an LLC after prime and prune,
the target cache set (set 1) is likely primed by the prime set.
In an ideal scenario, the order of cache accesses observed by
the LLC is the same order initiated by the attacker. As shown
1 The attacker might choose to use a small set to prime a portion of the
LLC but this will significantly reduce the success rate.
in Fig. 4b, if the attacker makes a timed re-access of the target
address X and the prime set sequentially, all the addresses with
long latency (miss in the LLC) are congruent and the number
of them is just enough for an eviction set. However, the order
seen by the LLC is normally different from the software order
as many cache accesses are filtered by the private caches. In
this scenario (Fig. 4c), the attacker collects some but less than
W congruent addresses. Normally she just has to test again
to force the order. As for the total number of cache accesses,
our experiments show that the prune process normally finishes
in less than two rounds. Meanwhile, the the size of the prime
set after pruning is slightly less than the cache size, which
means only one round of search is usually enough. The overall
number of cache accesses is estimated around O(SW ), which
is the smallest in the three fast algorithms.
This algorithm can be used to find eviction sets in LLCs
using other types of replacement policies. The estimated num-
ber of accesses for permutation-based replacement policies
(including LRU) is normally the same (O(SW )) [16] but it
approaches to O(SW 2) for LLCs using random replacement
for two reasons: One is the size of the prime set after pruning
is much smaller than the cache size SW , which reduces the
chance of finding congruent addresses in each round of search.
The other one is that, even if the target cache set is primed,
the number of congruent addresses found in each round of
test is significantly less than W (only one in most cases). The
attacker has to do multiple rounds of tests in multiple rounds
of searches [28].
E. Attack Randomized Caches using the Fast Algorithms
All the three search algorithms can easily defeat the static
version of randomized caches, such as CEASE [15]. As
a result, a randomized cache has to periodically remap its
content by updating the hardware managed key (Fig. 2). This
forces an attacker to dynamically search eviction sets and
finish an attack both in the remap period. Short remap period
increases the hardness to launch an attack [15].
However, frequent remaps lead to significant performance
loss. During the remap process, all cache blocks in the LLC
are sequentially relocated using the updated key. When there
is no available space at the new location, a cache block is
evicted to make space [15]. Our experiments show that 40%
to 50% cache blocks are evicted for this reason.
To reduce the performance overhead while thwarting at-
tacks, the remap period is carefully selected. For a 1024-set
16-way CEASER LLC, it has to remap around every 47K
accesses (only three accesses per cache block) [16], which
is an unbearably short period. This is why skewed caches
are currently preferred. For a same sized CEASER-S LLC
with two partitions, it is claimed that the remap period can
be safely increased to 1.6M accesses (100 accesses per cache
block) [16].
It becomes almost impossible to find (fully congruent)
eviction sets in a randomized skewed cache remapped at the
aforementioned rate. In its current form, the group elimination
algorithm simply fails in skewed cache due to the huge amount
of false negative errors introduced by the randomly selected
partitions. Both the conflict testing and the prime, prune
and then test algorithms might still be able to find partially
congruent eviction sets [28], which is the root of concern found
in this paper.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this paper, we would like to thoroughly examine the
effectiveness of cache randomization. To be specific, we plan
to answer the following questions.
Problem Statement:
• Do the existing cache randomization schemes/techniques
make any flawed hypothesis?
• If there are any flawed hypothesis, do they lead to broken
defenses and discovery of new vulnerabilities?
• Whether the broken defenses, if any, can be fixed?
Before diving into the detailed analysis, let us first describe
the threat model and the analysis platform.
A. Threat Model
The objective of using cache randomization is to deprive
attackers from useful eviction sets. We thus consider finding a
usable eviction set targeting a specific address as a successful
attack. Only conflict-based cache side-channel attacks target-
ing the LLC is considered in this paper. We assume the attacker
has the following favorable but still reasonable capabilities:
• She has fully reverse engineered the virtual to physical
address mapping.
• She has access to unlimited number of random addresses.
• She can make arbitrary memory access to her own data
and accurately infer cache hit/miss status by measuring
the access latency.
• She can flush a cache block from the whole cache
hierarchy as long as it is her own data.
• She can accurately trick the victim into running a single
memory access and there is no other active process during
the attack.
• She has the full design details of the randomized cache
but the encryption algorithm and the key used for generat-
ing cache set indices are unbreakable (we do not consider
attacks targeting weak encryptors [29] or random number
generators).
Note that we have explicitly allowed the attacker to flush her
own data and this is different from flush-reload attacks [30]
because there is no shared data between the attacker and the
victim. It is normally not required for conflict-based attacks
targeting non-randomized caches but attackers do have such
capability, such as a malicious user mode program running
on a x86-64 processor [31] or an malicious kernel running
on an ARM processor [32]. As described in Section IV-A,
allowing this enables attackers to launch attacks on the latest
randomized caches using partially congruent eviction sets.
P0 P1C0
C1
L1 LLC
Victim
Attacker
Fig. 5. When all cache blocks of the partially congruent eviction set (dot
with red shadow) are cached in the LLC but failed to evict the target block
(slash line with blue shadow), the eviction set become useless.
B. Analysis Platform
To quantitatively analyze the effectiveness of the latest
randomized caches, we choose to implement CEASER-S and
ScatterCache in a behavioral cache simulation model open-
sourced by [23], further extend the model with the defense
techniques newly proposed in Section V and VI, and attack
the randomized caches using the aforementioned fast search
algorithms. All results revealed in Section IV, V and VI are
obtained from these experimental attacks. To evaluate the
impact of the new defense techniques on normal applications
in Section VII, we run the SPEC CPU 2006 benchmark
cases [33] on the RISC-V [34] instruction level simulator
Spike [35] with its original cache model replaced with the
extended cache model [23]. The use of Spike allows us to run
benchmark cases at a speed around 1.5 million instructions
per second, which is ten times faster [36] than the Gem5
simulator [37] used in CEASER-S [16] and ScatterCache [17].
IV. DYNAMICALLY RANDOMIZED SKEWED CACHES ARE
STILL VULNERABLE
By quantitatively analyzing the traces left by various attacks
in the LLC, this section reveals the flawed hypotheses found in
the existing randomized caches and uses experimental attacks
to show that the defenses are indeed broken.
A. Flawed Hypothesis
Flawed hypothesis in CEASR-S: It is claimed in [16] that
an attacker must find eviction sets composed of fully congruent
cache blocks in order to evict the target address repeatedly.
This is true for certain scenarios but not always true. In order
to illustrate why this is not always true, let us first reflect on a
“true” scenario, which is depicted in Fig. 5. An attacker wants
to launch a cross-core attack from core zero (C0) to core one
(C1). She has found an eviction set composed of seven fully
congruent and one partially congruent cache blocks (dot with
red shadow), which should have a 50% probability to evict the
target address (slash line with blue shadow) in a skewed cache
with two partitions. Assuming the the attacker has successfully
evicted the target address several times, she will fail eventually
as the partially congruent cache block is randomly cached in
the wrong partition (P1) as depicted in Fig. 5. The eviction
set becomes useless afterwards.
From the attacker’s viewpoint, the reason of the failure is
the lack of enough self-conflicts to dislodge the misplaced par-
tially congruent cache blocks during the re-accessing. To reuse
a eviction set, attackers must find another way to purge the
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Fig. 6. The probability of evicting a target address (eviction rate) when
a partially congruent eviction set is applied repeatedly. All LLCs are with
the same size (1024-set 16-way). For skewed caches, the ways are divided
into 2, 4, 8 and 16 partitions. Each result is averaged from 1000 independent
experiments.
TABLE I
EXTRACTED FROM FIG. 6, THE ESTIMATED SIZES OF EVICTION SETS TO
REACH THE EXPECTED EVICTION RATES (30%, 50% AND 80%).
Cache Type 0.30 0.50 0.80
CEASER 16 16 16
Skew-2 25 30 39
Skew-4 45 59 87
Skew-8 68 108 190
Skew-16 90 172 400
misplaced blocks from the LLC. Although one research [28]
claims that it is still viable to construct covert channels by
priming the LLC, this would cause significant amount of noise
and noticeable performance degradation for normal prime-
probe attacks. We argue that attackers can accurately flush the
eviction set using cache flush instructions (such as clflush
in x86-64), which is much cleaner and faster than priming
the LLC. Our argument indicates that attacks using partially
congruent eviction sets could enjoy big success. Note that
using flush instructions here is fundamentally different with
the flush-reload attack [30] where the target address shared
between the attacker and the victim is flushed. All blocks in
an eviction set belong to the attacker’s own address space.
We also argue this is a valid threat even for future computers
because the cache flush instructions will be here to stay. We
used to think Intel would eventually remove the clflush
instruction due to the threat of flush-related attacks [30], [38]–
[40]. To our surprise, Intel not only continues to support
clflush in their new architectures but also introduces new
instructions with similar functionality, such as clflushopt
and CLWB. As described in the ISA Reference [31], these
instructions are added to reduce the performance overhead of
accessing persistent memory [41]. Since persistent memory is
a promising memory technology gradually adopted by almost
all major computer architectures, cache flush instructions will
remain in user land in the foreseeable future. Even if their
usage is limited to the privileged software, prime-probe attacks
from malicious kernels against other users/OSes [42], [43] or
SGX enclaves [7] are still practical.
Assuming attackers (can use cache flush instructions to)
flush their eviction sets after each probe, Fig. 6 reveals the
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 200  300  400  500  600  700  800
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 F
in
di
ng
 E
vic
tio
n 
Se
ts
Number of LLC Accesses (K)
Set-25
Set-30
Set-39
(a) Conflict testing (CT)
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(b) Prime, prune and then test (PPT)
Fig. 7. The probability of finding eviction sets with 25, 30 and 39 partially
congruent addresses in a skewed LLC (1024 sets, 16 ways, 2 patitions)
within limited number of LLC accesses. Each result is averaged from 500
independent experiments.
probability of evicting a target address (eviction rate) when
a partially congruent eviction set is applied repeatedly, which
complies with the theoretical analysis done in ScatterCache
(Fig. 5 in [17]): the eviction rate increases with the size of the
partially congruent eviction set. When enough addresses are
collected, a partially congruent eviction set can be used just
like a fully congruent one.
Flawed hypotheses in ScatterCache: It is claimed in
[17] that attackers must find eviction sets with 99% eviction
rate and must use a separate prime set to prime the LLC
after each probe (variant 1: single collision with eviction,
Section 4.4 [17]). Both hypotheses are invalid. An attacker can
make use of eviction sets with low eviction rate in persistent
attacks. Table I shows the number of partially congruent cache
blocks needed to achieve a certain eviction rate. An eviction
set with a lower eviction rate is much smaller than a set with
a higher eviction rate. Since the time consumed in finding
an eviction set is almost proportional to its size, attacker
can launch high-frequent attacks using small eviction sets to
compensate the low eviction rate. Even when a high eviction
rate is required, it can be achieved by repeatedly accessing an
eviction set with a low eviction rate. As describe in the flawed
hypothesis in CEASER-S, flushing the eviction set after each
probe is much cleaner and faster than priming the LLC.
B. Broken Defense
In the three fast search algorithms, only CT and PPT poten-
tially work on randomized skewed caches. Let us consider a
CEASER-S LLC with two partitions [16]. Fig. 7 demonstrates
the probability of finding eviction sets with 25, 30 and 39
partially congruent addresses (corresponding to eviction rates
of 30%, 50% and 90% respectively) using both CT and PPT.
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As shown by the result, although PPT is too long for any
practical attacks (5M to 20M LLC accesses as shown in
Fig. 7b), it is possible to find a small eviction set (30%
eviction rate) in as low as 350K LLC accesses using CT
(Fig. 7a), which is far less than the preferred remap period
of 1600K LLC accesses (100 accesses per cache block) [16].
In fact, 1600K LLC accesses are long enough to find partially
congruent eviction sets with 90% eviction rate.
The reasons for the failure of CEASER-S are twofold: One
is its neglect of the possibility of using partially congruent
eviction sets, which require much lower number of LLC
accesses to find than fully congruent eviction sets. The other
one is measuring the remap period by LLC accesses while
overlooking the filter effect of private caches. As a separate
test evaluating the probability of finding eviction sets within
limited number of LLC evictions, Fig. 8 reveals that nearly all
accesses observed by the LLC are misses caused by random
addresses. According to the description in Section II-D, half of
the cache accesses that re-access the target address are filtered
by private caches. The total number of cache accesses observed
by the LLC is halved.
Rather than periodically remapping the LLC, ScatterCache
proposes to use extra partitions to further increase the hardness
in finding eviction sets and assumes the extra hardness is
enough to thwart attacks [17]. ScatterCache estimates that
roughly 275 partially congruent addresses are needed to
achieve the 99% eviction rate in a randomized skewed cache
with eight partitions and finding such an eviction set requires
approximately 33.5M LLC evictions, which is an intimidat-
ing large number. Fig. 9 demonstrates the number of LLC
evictions required to finding a partially congruent eviction set
with 30% eviction rate in all types of randomized caches. If
an attacker tries to find a small eviction set (68 addresses for
30% eviction rate) instead of the large one, the total number of
LLC evictions is reduced to 1.1M, which is only 3.3% of what
the large eviction set needs.2 Even if an attacker requires the
99% eviction rate, she can choose to re-access and flush the
small eviction set 20 times. The total number of LLC evictions
is around 2.7K, which is just a negligible fraction (0.2%) of
the LLC evictions needed for finding the small set. The use
of eviction sets with low eviction rate significantly speeds up
attacks.
V. FIX THE RANDOMIZED SKEWED CACHES
Randomized skewed caches are still vulnerable to attacks
using partially congruent eviction sets found by the CT al-
gorithm. Several techniques are proposed in this section to
strengthen the defense while retain performance.
A. Count Cache Evictions Rather Than Accesses
As analyzed in Section IV-B, the failure of CEASER-S
is partially because the remap period is measured by LLC
accesses but half of the supposed accesses are filtered by
private caches. We propose to measure the remap period by
LLC evictions.
In the CT algorithm, when the target address is cached in
the LLC, the probability that a newly fetched random is cached
in the same set and partition with the target address can be
described as:
P =
1
SK
(2)
where K is the number of partitions. Assuming the LRU
replacement is used, the target address is evicted from the LLC
only when WK evictions occurred in the same set and partition,
which leads to WK evictions. Therefore, the probability of
collecting a partially congruent eviction set of L addresses
in E LLC evictions can be estimated as:
Prob(X ≥ L) = 1−
LW
K −1∑
i=0
(
E
i
)
P i(1− P )E−i (3)
As shown in Fig. 9, the theoretical probability calculated
using Equation 3 matches with the experiment result. We can
use this equation to estimate the time of finding an eviction set
(30% eviction rate) within different remap periods in various
randomized caches. Assuming the highest frequency of LLC
evictions is 800 MHz, Table II details the time estimation. If
we consider one year as a secure time margin for thwarting
potential attacks, the chosen remap periods along with its time
estimation are listed in the final column. To safely thwart
attacks, the remap period of a two partitioned CEASER-S LLC
2 We believe that ScatterCache has over-estimated the number of victim
accesses required. Instead of measuring the latency of re-accessing the random
address, an attacker can measure the latency of accessing the target address
(by the victim). This reduces the number of victim accesses to nways ·2bindices ·t,
which is 1
nways
of what ScatterCache estimates.
TABLE II
ESTIMATED TIME FOR SUCCESSFULLY FINDING AN EVICTION SET (30%
EVICT RATE) WITHIN DIFFERENT REMAP PERIODS (AVERAGE NUMBER OF
EVICTIONS PER CACHE BLOCK).
Cache Type 100 50 20 10 Chosen Period
CEASER 0.3ms 0.3ms 0.4ms 3.7y 10 (3.7y)
Skew-2 0.5ms 0.5ms 0.32s >100y 14 (204y)
Skew-4 0.9ms 0.9ms >100y >100y 25 (40y)
Skew-8 1.4ms 2.8s >100y >100y 35 (12y)
Skew-16 1.8ms 1.2h >100y >100y 39 (12y)
must be reduced to 14 LLC evictions per cache block. Even a
skewed cache with 16 partitions has to be remapped very 39
LLC evictions per cache block.
Such short remap periods might be considered intolerable.
However, remapping by counting LLC evictions is much more
efficient than counting LLC accesses because the LLC miss
rate of normal applications is much lower than attacks. In
an ideal scenario, if the miss rate in the LLC is sufficiently
low, remapping every 14 LLC evictions per cache block would
trigger less remaps than remapping every 100 LLC accesses
per cache block (preferred by CEASER-S). Our performance
experiments in Section VII-A will analyze this effect in details.
B. Multi-Step Cache Relocation
Our experiment shows that 40% to 50% cache blocks in
the LLC are evicted during the remap process, which is why
frequent remaps can hurt performance significantly. Borrowing
ideas from ZCache [24], we propose to use a multi-step
relocation in the remap process, which reduces the eviction
ratio to as low as 10%. This has two major benefits: One is
the reduced performance loss as extra blocks remain in the
LLC. The other one is the reduced damage from denial-of-
service attacks [44]. An attacker can trigger frequent remaps
by forcing a large amount of LLC accesses or evictions. Since
the remap process cannot differentiate victim’s data from the
attacker’s, the attacker can use remaps as a stealthy way to
blindly evict victim’s data. If the eviction ratio is reduced from
50% to just 10%, the return of such attacks becomes marginal.
In the remap process proposed by CEASER [15], cache sets
are remapped sequentially as illustrated in Fig. 10a. Remapped
blocks are recorded in their metadata (shadowed in gray) and
a set-relocation pointer (p) always points to the cache set
currently being remapped. The cache block E is currently
being relocated to the next cache set chosen by the new key
(k′). According to the replacement policy, G is evicted to make
a room for E. By repeating this procedure, all blocks in the set
are remapped and p moves to the next set. Since remapping
is a gradual procedure, normal cache accesses might occur in
parallel and Fig. 10b illustrates how the cache set index is
decided. The old cache set index i and the new one i′ are
produced simultaneously by two independent encrytors using
the old key k and the new key k′ respectively. When i ≥ p,
denoting the cache set is not remapped yet, the old index i is
used. Otherwise, the new index i′ should be used as the block
is either remapped or missing.
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Fig. 10. The remap process of CEASER (CEASER-S). Cache sets are
sequentially relocated as depicted in (a), where p points to the cache set
that s currently be relocated. During the remap process, the cache set index
for an incoming address is decided accoridng to (b).
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Fig. 11. A multi-step relocation process. When the destination of a relocation
is taken by an unremapped cache block, this block is further relocated until an
empty space is found as in (a) or a remapped cache block is found and evicted
instead. The cache set index for an incoming address is decided accoridng to
(b). When using the old cache set index i results in a miss, retry using the
new index i′.
The problem of the original remap process is the eviction
of G. Whenever the target cache set for a relocated block is
full, a cache block is evicted, which leads to a high number
of evictions at the beginning of the remap.
Such evictions might be avoidable. The relocation procedure
can keep on relocating the blocks to be evicted, such as
G, in a chain until either a free space if found, as shown
in Fig. 11a, or a remapped block is to be evicted. Note
that using multi-step relocation does not increases the total
number of relocated blocks. Once a block is relocated once,
it is recorded as remapped and will not be relocated again.
The total number of blocks to be relocated is equal to the
number of blocks in the LLC in both methods. As shown
in Fig. 12, by increasing the allowed number of relocations
to unlimited, the percentage of blocks retained in the LLC
grows. Randomized set-associative caches (CEASER) benefits
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 Unlimited
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f R
et
ai
ne
d 
Ca
ch
e 
Bl
oc
ks
Number of Relocations
CEASER
Skew-2
Skew-4
Skew-8
Skew-16
Fig. 12. The percentage of cache blocks retained during remapping by
applying limited number of relocations. The maximum retaining percentage
is achieved when ‘infinite’ trials of relocation are applied until a remapped
cache block is found as the replacement (and evicted). Each result is averaged
from 100 independent experiments.
data
array
metadata
array
transaction
tracker
writeback
unit
L1/L2
DRAM
remap
tracker
relocated block
Fig. 13. Support multi-step relocation in the LLC of the Rocket-Chip.
the most as the percentage increases from 63% to 90%. The
boost for randomized skewed caches drops gradually with the
number of partitions.
The calculation of the cache set index needs a small change
to support the multi-step relocation. As shown in Fig. 11b,
when i ≥ p, the old cache set index i should be used in the
same way as in the original CEASER. However, if it results in
a miss, the new cache set index i′ should be used in a retrial
as the block might have already be relocated. Since reading
the metadata array and checking cache hit typically finish in
one or two cycles, and retrials occur only occasionally during
the relatively short remap process, the performance impact is
trivial considering the significantly reduced eviction ratio.
Supporting multi-step relocation in the actual cache hard-
ware should be straightforward. Fig. 13 demonstrates the
internal structure of the LLC (L2) used in the Rocket-Chip
SoC [45] (available from lowRISC v0.4 [46]), which is a
widely adopted open processor design taped out for tens
of times. To support multiple concurrent cache transactions
initiated from the multiple L1 caches, a cache slice implements
multiple transaction trackers sharing the same accesses to the
metadata array, the data array, and the writeback unit. When an
incoming transaction is not blocked by race conditions, a free
tracker is allocated to serve it. To support remaps, a special
remap tracker is added. During a remap, it tracks the set-
relocation pointer and gradually relocates all cache blocks. In
the case of multi-step relocation, when an unremapped cache
block is swapped out, the remap tracker throw it back to itself
as a prioritized writeback transaction. As long as unremapped
blocks are swapped out, they are continuously relocated until a
free space is found or a remapped block is swapped out instead
(which is evicted). This recursive procedure effectively imple-
ments the unlimited steps of relocation. The only hardware
changes necessary to support multi-step relocation are adding
an incoming port to the remap tracker and modifying its state
machine accordingly.
VI. USE NORMAL CACHES RATHER THAN SKEWED
CACHES
Instead of advocating the use of randomized skewed cache
like CEASER-S and ScatterCache, we argue that randomized
set-associative caches can be sufficiently strengthened and
possess a better chance to be actually adopted in commercial
processors than their skewed counterparts. Supported by a
literature research with our best effort, we cautiously believe
that skewed caches [47], [48] have not yet adopted in LLCs
of any commercially available modern processors. Promoting
them purely for security benefits might be a hard sale.
A. Issues with Skewed Caches
We agree that skewed caches can improve cache efficiency
by reducing conflicts [47] and are natural candidates for
compressed caches [48]. However, it seems that they are not
yet embraced by the industry. One potential reason has already
been pointed out by CEASER-S [16]: The benefit of skewed
caches diminishes when the cache associativity increases. As
caches in modern processors are typically highly associative,
the marginal gain in performance might not justify the extra
hardware cost. For this reason, CEASER-S chooses to use
only two partitions. Some of our experiments show excessive
skewing (too many partitions) actually hurt performance as it
reduces the efficiency of the LRU replacement. One example is
already revealed in Fig. 12. The benefit of multi-step relocation
drops with the increasing number of partitions.
From our own perspective in hardware designs, we also
believe that skewed cache significantly complicates the de-
sign of modern LLCs which typically serve multiple cache
transactions in parallel. Taking the LLC design of the Rocket-
Chip (as shown in Fig. 13) as an example, before a tracker can
accept a transaction, the LLC must ensure that this transaction
would not conflict with the others currently being served. This
typically means no two transactions served simultaneously
should access the same cache set. Otherwise, one of the
conflicting transactions should be blocked before it is accepted
by a tracker (race condition). This is not a serious issue for
set-associative caches as the cache set index of an incoming
transaction can be calculated beforehand and compared with
the indices of all active trackers simultaneously in a single
cycle. For a skewed cache with K partitions and T trackers,
the incoming transaction might access anyone of the K
possible cache sets and it is not decided until it results in
a hit or a target set is chosen for replacement. In the worst
scenario, K · TK parallel comparisons (rather than T for the
set-associative cache) are required to check potential conflicts
for an incoming transaction. Besides the obvious hardware
cost in doing so, this significantly increases the probability of
blocking an incoming transaction due to a conflict that is not
going to occur. It then prolongs the cache accessing latency.
Therefore, we would like to investigate potential techniques
to strengthen the randomized set-associative caches.
B. Remap When under Attack
Although randomized skewed caches are vulnerable only
to the CT algorithm, randomized set-associative caches are
vulnerable to all the three search algorithms introduced in
Section II-D. To thwart the CT algorithm, a 1024-set 16-way
CEASER LLC has to remap every 10 LLC evictions per cache
block according to Table II, which allows for a total of 160K
LLC evictions between remaps. However, our experiements
show that the numbers of LLC evictions (accesses) needed
for finding an eviction set are around 40.8K (168K) using the
PPT algorithm and 81.3K (532K) using the GE algorithm.
Both are valid threats.
Instead of shrinking the already short remap period, we
propose to trigger a remap when an attack using the two
algorithms is detected because both of them leave a unique
pattern in the cache set distribution of evictions. Let us first
consider the PPT algorithm. By periodically sampling the
number of accesses and evictions occurred on individual cache
sets during two consecutive attacks, Fig. 14a and 14b reveal
the distribution of LLC accesses and evictions over all cache
sets. Both distributions seem totally random. However, if we
apply a Z-Score [49] standardization on the distributions,
we can see two clear peaks in the standardized eviction
distribution (Fig. 14d), although it is still random for the the
standardized access distribution (Fig. 14c). The two peaks
appear in the test phase of the PPT algorithm. After the prune
phase, all blocks in the prime set are concurrently cached in
the LLC. If there is any eviction in the test phase, it must occur
on the target cache set. As a result, the score of the target cache
set reaches the maximum (32 for a 1024-set LLC) while it is
zero on other sets.
The GE algorithm presents a similar pattern as demonstrated
by Fig. 15. Scores are small and randomly distributed at the
early stage of the two simulated attacks but converge on a
single cache set when the large eviction set is finally condensed
into a minimal one.
Since GE spends more time on condensing the eviction set
than PPT testing the prime set, detecting a PPT attack is harder
than GE and we finalize our detector against the PPT algorithm
(as it should work on GE as well). We starts from a non-
centered variant of the Z-Score standardization [50] to avoid
negative scores:
zi =
ei√∑
e2
S−1
(4)
where ei is the number of evictions on cache set i and zi is the
calculated score for cache set i. The score of the target cache
set approaches to the maximum of
√
S in an ideal attack.
However, reporting an attack whenever a maximum score is
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Fig. 14. Detect the PPT attack by analyzing the cache set distributions
of accesses and evictions. In all figures, the x-axis denotes the cache set
index while the y-axis denotes simulation time measured in LLC accesses.
The colored value denotes the number of accesses/evictions on a specific set
occurred in a sample period. The chosen sample period is 16K LLC accesses.
(a) and (b) depicts the set distribution of accesses and evictions during two
round of attacks. (c) and (d) depicts the standardized version of (a) and (b)
using the Z-Score method [49], [50].
detected leads to false positive errors. When the LLC miss
rate is extremely low during normal operation, there might
be only one eviction during the whole sample period, which
also results in a maximum score. To avoid such errors, we
introduce the number of evictions into Equation 4 as weight:
wzi = (ei − e¯) · zi (5)
where wzi is the weighted score. Sine an eviction set requires
at least W addresses, the weighted score of the target cache
set approaches to W · √S during the test phase of an ideal
PPT attack.
An attacker can avoid detection if the detection threshold is
simply set to W ·√S. She can hide her trace by spreading the
test phase over multiple sample periods. In the extreme case,
the attacker can collect only one congruent address in each
round of PPT attack, which effectively caps the weighted score
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Fig. 15. Detect the group elimination attack by analyzing the standardized
cache set distribution of evictions.
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Fig. 16. The probability of finding an eviction set under active detection.
Three sample periods are chosen: 16K, 8K and 4K LLC accesses. Each result
is averaged from at least 200 independent experiments.
to
√
S.3 To detect such behavior and improve the robustness
of the detector, we apply an exponential moving average
(EMA) [51], [52] on the weighted score:
azi(t) = (1− α) · azi(t− 1) + α · wzi(t) (6)
where α is a discount factor used to calculate azi(t), the EMA
of wzi at sample t. The use of EMA allows the detector to
examine the history of wz because az is an infinite impulse
response of wz. wz should be a zero-centered small number
for normal applications. During the test phases of an attack, the
wz of the target cache set unavoidably raises to at least
√
S.
By using a small α, the az of the target cache set effectively
accumulates the large wz over the history, which makes it
sufficiently significant for detection. We set the discount factor
α to 132 by a heuristic analysis.
When the az of a certain cache set reaches a threshold
(az ≥ th), the detector triggers a remap. The value of th
is crucial to the speed and the correctness of the detector. The
detector might leave a small window for a quick attack if a
remap is late due to a large th. However, normal programs
might trigger remaps if th is too small. To choose a proper
th, we run PPT attacks detected by different combinations of
threshold and sample period (4K, 8K and 16K LLC accesses).
As shown in Fig. 16, sampling every 4K LLC accesses and
3 In practice, the number of rounds is limited because remaps will be
triggered due to the excessive number of accumulated LLC evictions.
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a CEASER LLC. ACC-10: remap every 10 accesses per cache block; EV-10:
remap every 10 evictions per cache block; DT: attack detection. The static
CEASE is used as the baseline.
triggering a remap whenever az ≥ 5 is enough to reduce the
probability of finding eviction set to almost nil. Although not
shown in the paper, we have verified that GE attacks cannot
escape detection with the same parameters.
VII. PERFORMANCE
As the performance overhead of randomized caches has
been shown to be acceptable [15]–[17], we analyze only the
performance impact of the newly proposed techniques.
A. Impact on Normal Applications
The SPEC CPU 2006 benchmark suite [33] is used to
evaluate the impact on normal applications. Similar to Scatter-
Cache, performance results are measured without concurrent
processes [17]. As described in Section III-B, we use a
modified Spike simulator [35] as the evaluation platform. A
processing core has two private L1 data and instruction caches
(16KB, 64-set, 8-way, 64B cache block). A 1024-set 16-way
L2 cache is used as the LLC where all randomized caches
are implemented. All cache levels use the LRU replacement.
Thanks to the fast simulation speed of Spike, we are able to
run 100G instructions for each benchmark case, which is 100
and 400 times of the instructions simulated in CEASER[15]
and ScatterCache [17]. Fig. 17 shows the number of misses per
K instructions (MPKI) using a static CEASE LLC, which is
used as the baseline for other performance results. The MPKI
figures match with the result provided in CEASER[15].
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Fig. 19. Remaps per G instructions (RPGI) of SPEC CPU 2006 benchmark
cases. In (b), DT and EV denote the remaps triggered by attack detection and
reaching remap period respectively.
Fig. 18 demonstrates the performance overhead of different
remap strategies on a CEASER LLC. The remap period is
increased to 10 accesses/evictions per cache block to thwart
the CT attack. The average overhead is 0.61%, 0.077% and
0.19% for ACC-10 (remapping by accesses), EV-10 (remap-
ping by evictions) and EV-DT-10 (EV-10 plus attack detection)
respectively. Measuring the remap period by evictions rather
than accesses reduces MPKI by 69% with attack detection or
87% without.
Such significant performance boost comes from two rea-
sons: One is the reduced number of remaps as shown in
Fig. 19a. The average reduction is 64% with attack detection
or 71% without. The other one is the reduced impact for each
remap. To explain this effect, Fig. 20 depicts the run-time
MPKI and miss rate curves extracted from a representative
window of the 403.gcc (expr2) benchmark case. Note that for
the LLC remapped by accesses, the remap period is increased
to 100 accesses per cache block to avoid excessive remaps
(a totally pink colored background). Remapping by accesses
inclines to remap when both MPKI and miss rate are low,
such as the time segments of (11–13), (19–20), and (26–
30) G instructions, while there is nearly no remaps when
remapping by evictions. What is worse, these remaps lead to
unnecessary block evictions which in turn raise the miss rate.
On the contrary, remapping by evictions inclines to remap
when the miss rate is high, such as the time segments of
(22–23) and (25–26). During these segments, the utilization
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Fig. 20. Compare the triggered remaps of running the SPEC CPU 2006
case 403.gcc (expr2). Each remap is depicted as a vertical pink line in the
background.
efficiency of the LLC is already reduced by the high miss rate.
The performance impact of the unnecessarily evicted blocks
in each remap is thus weakened.
The cost of enabling attack detection in CEASER is rel-
atively small compared with the performance boost from
remapping by evictions. As shown in Fig. 19a, the cost of
detection in only 7% of the original cost of remapping by
accesses. Fig. 19b provides a detailed analysis of the remaps
triggered by detection. For most benchmark cases, the number
of mistakenly detected attacks (false positive errors) is tiny.
Only cases like 403.gcc and 456.hmmer have high numbers of
false positive errors. Since the absolute number of remaps for
456.hmmer is extremely low (RPGI ≈ 8 in Fig. 19a), the high
rate of false positive errors does not actually hurt performance.
As for 403.gcc, the absolute number of MPKI increased from
10.25 to 10.47, leading to a 2.1% increase. Considering the
MPKI is relatively low, a 2.1% increase on the the low MPKI
should be tolerable.
Fig. 21 shows the normalized MPKI of all types of ran-
domized caches using the static CEASE as the baseline. In
general, skewed caches with a moderate number of partitions
indeed reduce MPKI but such reduction is marginal (less
than 0.5%). When more than eight partitions are used, MPKI
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Fig. 21. Normalized MPKI of SPEC CPU 2006 benchmark cases using
the static CEASE as the baseline. EV: remapping by evictions; DT: attack
detection; MS: multi-step relocation.
begins to rise and introduce performance loss. This is why
we blieve randomized set-associate caches (CEASER) should
be used if they are safely strengthened. For CEASER LLCs,
periodically remapping by evictions introduces 0.08% extra
MPKI and enabling attack detection adds another 0.11%, but
adopting the multi-step relocation would reduce the overhead
back to a trivial 0.007%. This result shows that we can
make the randomized set-associate cache safe enough without
significant performance loss. As for skewed caches, utilizing
the multi-step relocation reduces MPKI roughly by 0.05% and
the skewed cache with only two partitions benefits the most
(0.08%). This complies with our estimation in Fig. 12.
B. Logic and Memory Overhead
The memory overhead of randomized caches has been ana-
lyzed in [15], [16]; therefore, we estimate only the extra cost
using the new techniques. We use a single core Rocket-Chip
implemented by lowRISC (version 0.4) [46] as the base. Using
the same configuration as used in the Spike simulator, the LLC
(L2 cache) consumes around 22% logic and 99% SRAM of the
processor (without outer AXI buses and devices). To support
remaps, a remap tracker is added to the LLC which original
has two acquire (access) trackers and one release (writeback)
tracker. The extra area overhead would be round 7.6% logic
of the processor (34% logic of the LLC). This overhead is
relatively high but unavoidable. Remapping by evictions rather
than accesses introduces no area overhead. The overhead of
supporting multi-step relocation is also marginal because the
only changes required are adding a port to the remap tracker
and modifying its state machine. To estimate the overhead
of attack detection, we made a prototype of the detector
in hardware. The hardware detector finishes each round of
detection in 2K cycles (less than the sample period of 4K
LLC accesses). By shrinking the precision of the intermediate
results and reducing multiplier/divider to adder/shifter, the
detection error is within 5% compared with the software
implementation while the area overhead (after place and route)
is around 0.8% logic and 0.4% SRAM of the processor
(3.5% logic and 0.4% SRAM of the LLC), both of which
are marginal.
VIII. DISCUSSION
New cache designs: Since the introduction of randomized
skewed caches, two new designs [18], [20] have been proposed
and both of them promote the use of set-associative caches.
Indirection table (iTable) based two level dynamic randomiza-
tion (TLDR) [18] tries to strengthen CEASER by another layer
of randomization using an iTable. An address is first randomly
mapped to an iTable entry and then the entry is mapped
to a random cache set. It is claimed that the extra iTable
provides higher level of randomness than randomized skewed
caches and gradually remapping iTable entries reduces the
remap-related performance loss. PhantomCache [20] proposes
to place an incoming cache block in one of the randomly
selected cache sets rather than partitions as in skewed caches.
This increases the level of randomness and allows the use
of LRU for the whole cache set. Both designs can safely
defeat the GE attack but their effectiveness against CT and
PPT attacks needs further investigation. Finally Doblas [19]
extends the cache randomization from LLC to the L1 caches
by using simple randomization functions.
Performance evaluation: The performance results of all ex-
isting caceh randomization designs come from various Gem5
simulations [15]–[17], [20], [37], whose slowness limited
the total number of instructions that can be simulated in
resaonable time, which further contrains the coverage on
respective workloads [53], [54]. Our choices of using the
fast (event-driven and timeless) Spike simulation allows us
to boost the number of simulated instructions by 100 ∼ 400
times, which signifcantly increases the coverage on respective
workloads, but limits the performance evaluation in miss rate
only, leaveing the overhead on CPU execution time unstated.
We believe this is a reasonable trade-off as the estimation
on CPU execution time is inaccurate and cannot be used
to compare between designs even if the slowest Gem5 OoO
model [37] is used. The reason is the lack of consensus on
which encryption algorithm should be adopted especially after
the one used by CEASER has been found problematic [29]. It
is still an open challenge to choose a strong and fast encryption
algorithm for randomized caches. As a result, we do not have
a fair way to evaluate the execution time and cache miss rate
is the only frequently used and unbiased metric available.
Attack detection: Run-time detection of cache side-channel
attacks using the existing performance counters (pfc) [52],
[55]–[58] has shown to be effective to detect persistent attacks
by software. Some software detectors adopt machine learning
algorithms to increases the detection accuracy [55], [57] but
they are always constrained by the limited information avail-
able from pfc. Hardware detectors [59], [60] begin to appear
recently. Most of them exploit the cyclic pattern between an
attacker and her victim [58]–[60]. The concentration of cache
accesses on certain cache sets during the exploitation phase
has long been discovered [21], [52], [61]. The exponential
moving average was also used in software detectors [52].
Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first
to use a simple hardware detector to detect the searching of
eviction sets utilizing the concentrated set distribution.
New attacks: Purnal improves the original PPT attack [16]
by introducing the prune phase and points out it is possible to
use partially congruent eviction set to launch covert channel
attacks on ScatterCache [28]. Our simulation and analysis on
PPT are based on Purnal’s work but with our own optimized
prune method as it is not clearly described in [28]. Our experi-
ments show that PPT attacks would fail on randomized skewed
caches because the accumulated number of LLC evictions
always surpasses the proposed remap period. However, it is
very likely that the prune process can be further optimized to
reduce its footprint in evictions.
IX. CONCLUSION
We have newly discovered several problems with the hy-
potheses and implementations in the latest randomized skewed
caches: The possibility of using cache flush instructions in
conflict-based attacks has been overlooked. The concept of
minimal eviction set no longer applies to randomized skewed
caches. Attackers do not have to use eviction sets with 99%
eviction rate. Measuring the remap period by LLC accesses
is flawed. As a result, existing randomized skewed caches are
still vulnerable to conflict-based cache side-channel attacks.
We proposed several defense techniques/suggestions to fix
the newly discovered problems: Measure the remap period by
LLC evictions rather than accesses while further reduce the
period. Adopte ZCache-like multi-step relocation to minimize
the number of cache blocks evicted during the remap process.
Our experiments show that all the newly discovered vulnerabil-
ities are fixed within the current performance budget. We also
claim that randomized set-associative cache can be sufficiently
strengthened with reasonable overhead using a simple attack
detection mechanism. Compared with randomized skewed
caches, randomized set-associative caches are better candidates
for future commercial processors.
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